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D

amage Control and the
1921 Tampa Hurricane: Boosters,
Businessmen, and Bad Press
by Nicole Cox

M

rs. Jessie C. Rohrer, the wife of Edward P. Rohrer, emerged from
her home the morning after a hurricane hit Tampa on Tuesday, October 25, 1921.
In her journal, she documented the damage generated by Tampa’s worst hurricane
in over seventy years, which she described excitedly and underlined for emphasis,
“Some storm.”1 The Rohrers owned a sizable amount of land in Tampa and lived in
a wooded area close to the water, which provided Mrs. Rohrer with plenty of acreage
for her extensive garden and chicken-raising enterprise. Much of her journal, which
she kept from 1916 to 1959, focuses on her interests as a gardener and a botanist.
However, the brief entry for the 1921 hurricane, written in pencil and now faded on
crumbling pages, reinforced the significance of a natural disaster rarely mentioned in
Florida history books.
According to Mrs. Rohrer’s journal, the tide rose through the woods and came
within fifty feet of their house while eight feet of water covered her beloved garden.2
Local history books echo this account with reports that the tide rose ten and one-half
feet above mean low tide, five feet higher than any hurricane since 1848.3 Although
weather reports and more recent accounts of the hurricane described the rising tide as
the most destructive feature of this storm, the damage caused by the wind impressed
Mrs. Rohrer, and she noted in her entry: “Wind 78 miles per hour in gusts. 68 miles
per hour for 3 hours steady blow.”4
Nicole Cox is in the M.A. history program at the University of South Florida, Tampa campus. Her
research focuses on 20th century U.S. cultural and environmental history.

Journal of Jessie C. Rohrer, “1921 Hurricane, Tuesday, Oct. 25,” Tampa Manuscript Collection,
Special Collections, USF Library, Tampa.
2
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Page from Jessie Rohrer’s diary, dated Tuesday, October 25, 1921. Rohrer vividly describes the storm,
including the damage to her property and the extent of the storm surge.

The wind speed barely registered the storm as a category 1 hurricane on the
modern Saffir/Simpson scale, which was first introduced to the public in 1975. The
classification parameters before the introduction of this system identified hurricanes
as “Great Hurricanes, Severe Hurricanes, or Minor, Minimal, Major or Extreme
Hurricanes.” 5 However, even the wind from a minor hurricane can produce extensive
damage, as evidenced by Mrs. Rohrer’s description of the oak, cedar, bay, myrtle,
mulberry, and persimmon trees blown down on her property as well as the loss
of the garage roof. The hurricane tossed many of these trees into the river, which
captured Mrs. Rohrer’s attention because the trees “were filled with dead chickens.”
This entry ended rather abruptly with Mrs. Rohrer’s clarification, “Not our chickens
however.”6
General histories of Florida overlook or only briefly mention the 1921 hurricane
that affected Tampa and its environs. An obvious explanation for this omission is that
John M. Williams and Iver W. Duedall, Florida Hurricanes and Tropical Storms: 1871-2001
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), 4.
6
Journal of Jessie C. Rohrer.
5
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the 1921 hurricane paled in comparison with the 1926 hurricane, which ravaged
Miami and the surrounding areas. In this storm, Moore Haven endured the most
severe loss of life when the Okeechobee dike collapsed, sending a tidal wave rolling
through the town, killing over three hundred people.7 Two short years later, the even
more infamous “killer cane” of 1928 brought wind gusts of 150 miles per hour and
killed thousands.8 In spite of boosters’ attempts to downplay even the catastrophic
1926 and 1928 hurricanes, research suggests that more people died in hurricane
disasters during this period than at any other time in Florida history.9
Scholarship surrounding the latter hurricanes often identifies the natural
disasters as death knells for the Florida land boom and a precipitant of the much
greater “bust” the United States would experience in the following years. During
the 1920s land boom, Florida’s attributes were sold to thousands of people in
magazines, newspapers, movies, and other popular outlets. Mass production and
mass consumerism characterized the 1920s, making Florida and the land boom
accessible to the flourishing middle class, not just to the upper stratum of American
society. Some people were in search of paradise, while others were more interested in
the prospect of becoming very rich, very quickly. “Florida fever” swept the nation.
During the early 1920s, real estate business in Florida began to increase at
an unheard-of rate, reaching its peak in 1924 and 1925. Historians approximate
that between 1923 and 1925, more than three hundred thousand people settled in
Florida. During this period, nine of the thirteen new counties created were in the
southern part of the state.10 The 1925 Florida State Census showed a growth rate that
exceeded 35 percent in the preceding decade.11 Despite all of the methods employed
by boosters, the boom went bust in a matter of years, and the hurricanes did little
to improve Florida’s image in the eyes of the nation. In Mockingbird Song: Ecological
Landscapes of the South, Jack Temple Kirby assesses the effect of these storms and
concludes, “The Great Florida Boom of the 1920s was practically silenced by awesome
hurricanes in 1926 and 1928.”12 Thus, it is not surprising that Florida history books
immortalize these storms and mention them in the larger context of the state’s boomand-bust period of the 1920s.

Charlton W. Tebeau, “Boom-Bust-Hurricane Twenties,” in A History of Florida (Coral Gables:
University of Miami Press, 1971), 387.
8
Robert Mykle, Killer ‘cane: The Deadly Hurricane of 1928 (New York: Cooper Square Press,
2002), 170.
9
Ted Steinberg, Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 53.
10
Michael Gannon, The New History of Florida (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996),
291.
11
1925 Florida State Census (Tallahassee: T. J. Appleyard, 1926), 15. Floridiana Collection, Special
Collections, USF Library, Tampa.
12
Jack Temple Kirby, Mockingbird Song: Ecological Landscapes of the South (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2006), 7.
7

Published by Scholar Commons, 2008

3

Tampa Bay History, Vol. 22 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 3

4

Tampa Bay History

However, research on the 1921 hurricane reveals the need to study this less
severe and seldom discussed natural disaster in the context of the boom’s takeoff.
Boosters and citizens expressed determination not to let a hurricane interfere with the
image and success of the “Year Round City,” as advertisers christened Tampa during
the 1920s.13 Advertisers’ efforts added new meaning to the modern phrase “damage
control” in both a literal and figurative sense. As the environmental historian Ted
Steinberg explains in Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America,
“Natural disaster has a very shadowy history in Florida, rooted in years of denial
for the sake of more hotels and suburban sprawl.”14 By studying different accounts
that sensationalize, downplay, and even deny the damage generated by the storm,
while emphasizing the significance of the upcoming boom, this research provides a
fresh outlook on the relationship between development and disaster. Reactions and
responses to the 1921 hurricane paralleled Mike Davis’s conclusion in Ecology of Fear:
Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster: “Even the weather (or rather its normative
representation) is subject to ideological construction.”15
Before and after the storm, local leaders, businessmen, realtors, and eventually
the press sought to cover up the damage caused by the hurricane and rushed to draw
attention back to the “paradise” they marketed as Florida. This analysis of the 1921
Tampa hurricane suggests that local businessmen and the press succeeded in their
efforts to gloss over the natural disaster that occurred in the early stages of Tampa’s
1920s boom. Not only did the hurricane fail to deter the boom, but it actually
facilitated the boom’s success locally.
Striking Tampa on October 25, the 1921 storm occurred late in the official
hurricane season that runs from June 1 through November 30. In Florida’s Hurricane
History, the historian Jay Barnes traces the path of the 1921 hurricane, explaining
that August, September, and October are typically considered to be the peak months
for Atlantic hurricanes, with September being “the most dangerous month for
tropical cyclones in Florida.”16 However, in spite of the statistical analyses performed
on hurricanes and the improved tracking, Barnes notes: “Statistics can be misleading
in any attempt to determine what to expect in the future. And few hurricane seasons
seem average in Florida.”17
The twentieth century ushered in a period of greater public awareness of the
existence and approach of weather phenomena. Kirby explains, “Until the twentieth
century, however, if nor’easters and hurricanes were recorded at all, they became
‘historical’ and ‘public’ only to sparse populations affected and random readers of
Van Beynum Horn, “City and Community Slogans,” Suniland 1, no. 3 (December 1924): 41.
Floridiana Collection, Special Collections, USF Library, Tampa.
14
Steinberg, Acts of God, 48.
15
Mike Davis, Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster (New York:
Metropolitan Books, 1998), 159-60.
16
Jay Barnes, Florida’s Hurricane History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 8.
17
Ibid. 9.
13
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Tampa’s Bayshore Boulevard is completely covered with water in this image, taken as the 1921 Hurricane
made landfall. A row of palm trees and power lines, which stood along the roadway, can be seen in the
background.

weather records thereafter.”18 This greater public awareness resulted from population
growth, new technology, and an expanding government. The U.S. Weather Bureau,
which operated under the aegis of the Department of Agriculture, issued an official
report in the hurricane’s wake that provided insight into the efficacy of the 1920s
warning system. According to the report, advisory messages indicating “formation and
movement of hurricane had been received Friday and Saturday.”19 A brief mention
in the Sunday, October 23, edition of the Tampa Morning Tribune explained that on
October 22, the Bureau reported that a tropical storm of “considerable intensity” was
moving northward, over the northwestern Caribbean.20 As the storm strengthened
and moved over the Caribbean, the Bureau took observations at 1:00 p.m. and 4:00
p.m. on October 23 and telegraphed advisories. On Monday, October 24, at 10:40
a.m., the Bureau issued northeast storm warnings that quickly changed to hurricane
warnings by 12:34 p.m. the same day.
According to the report, as the Bureau received advisories and observational
updates, it telegraphed these to “displaymen” and contacted persons on an emergency

Kirby, Mockingbird Song, 6.
Weather Bureau U.S. Department of Agriculture, Hurricane Report Tampa October 25, 1921, 1.
Floridiana Collection, Special Collections, USF Library, Tampa.
20
“Hurricane Rounding Swan Isle for North,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 23 October 1921.
18
19
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list.21 The description of the warnings issued during the 1921 hurricane suggests
that the national Weather Bureau efficiently dealt with the situation. However, an
examination of the local response indicates a lack of concern regarding the storm’s
approach. In Barnes’s description of hurricane preparedness in the 1920s and 1930s,
he explains that advance notice, if it came, was usually short. Remote areas might
have no idea of an impending storm.22
The local response to these official warnings and advisories did not indicate
the same level of preparedness or apprehension as the U.S. Weather Bureau report.
Although the report claimed to widely publicize the advisories, an article in the
Tampa Morning Tribune suggested local skepticism and a general lack of concern
regarding the approaching storm.23 The article, “Yucatan’s Blow Is Headed into
Gulf,” reported the official weather bulletin from Washington but included a section
titled “No Storms Here.” W. J. Bennett, who served as head of the local government
weather bureau, reported on the storm’s current location, but he seemed to dismiss
the potential threat. “It was about eleven years ago that Tampa experienced its closest
acquaintance with a hurricane,” he explained. “On Oct. 18, 1910, one passed so close
that the barometer reached 28.94, and the wind was forty-eight miles per hour. No
great damage was done locally.” He neglected to mention that ten people perished
during the 1910 storm.24
Clearly, Bennett’s report was designed to quell any rising fears about the
hurricane. Meanwhile, the rain had begun to fall on October 23, “and continued
with scarcely a break until 9:15 P.M. of the 25th,” resulting in a total rainfall of 8.53
inches, 6.48 of which fell in a twenty-four-hour period between October 24 and 25.25
Bennett later disputed the official total and claimed that the rainfall exceeded this
amount, but wind during the hurricane blew rain out of the gauge.26
The headline in the October 25, 1921, edition of the Tribune blared,
“Barometer Falls as Hurricane Heads in to Florida’s Coast.” This article emphasized
the storm’s imminent approach, but both the writer and meteorologist Bennett
remained hopeful that the storm would not affect Tampa. In fact, below the main
headline, the writer included the note, “May Pass Tampa By as in All Past Instances.”
Nevertheless, Bennett urged, “Every precaution should be taken in expectation of
winds with a velocity of forty miles an hour or more.”27 The Tribune did not resume
the paper until October 27, 1921, as the hurricane hit on the afternoon of October
25, eliminating communication with the outside world and probably providing little

Weather Bureau U.S. Department of Agriculture, Hurricane Report, 1.
Barnes, Florida’s Hurricane History, 33.
23
Weather Bureau U.S. Department of Agriculture, Hurricane Report, 1.
24
“Records Property Loss Are Smashed,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 27 October 1921.
25
Weather Bureau U.S. Department of Agriculture, Hurricane Report, 1.
26
“Yucatan’s Blow Headed into Gulf,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 24 October 1921.
27
“Barometer Falls As Hurricane Heads in to Florida’s Coast,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 25 October
1921.
21
22
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opportunity for citizens to heed Bennett’s warning in the morning paper. In the
midst of the deluge, the Tampa Daily Times released a special “Storm Edition” using
the publishing office of the Plant City Courier.28
In his 1950 history of Tampa, Karl H. Grismer summarized the storm’s path:
“The hurricane developed in the Caribbean, swung around the western end of
Cuba, proceeded northward to the latitude of Tampa Bay and then swung inland.”29
The official weather report determined that the eye of the hurricane passed over
Tarpon Springs, located on the Gulf of Mexico northwest of Tampa.30 This area also
experienced the lowest barometric pressure during the storm and peak wind gusts
of over 100 miles per hour.31 It should be noted, however, that the official weather
report did not mention these extreme wind gusts.
When the October 27, 1921, issue of the Tribune appeared, the front page
declared, “Loss through Storm Severe; May Total $5 Million for South Florida; $2
Million Loss in Tampa & Vicinity; Only Few Lives Lost.” This damage assessment
paralleled the official hurricane report that detailed Tampa’s destruction. Estimates
varied as local insurance agents tried to approximate the total loss. The Tampa Daily
Times described the difficulty of this task due to the “absence of cyclone insurance
policies here, the adjustment of which might have furnished appraisers with a working
basis for estimating the loss.”32 Only a handful of Tampans possessed insurance that
had such a policy, which emphasized the lack of hurricane preparedness in 1921.33
Local businesses were especially hard hit. Tampa Electric Company experienced
significant damage, estimated at $200,000, as a result of power plant flooding and
falling wires. The Peninsular Telephone Company and the Oscar Daniels shipbuilding
plant experienced moderate losses. Residential and commercial destruction totaled
$300,000. Downtown stores and waterfront residences fared the worst, especially in
the suburbs of Palmetto Beach, Edgewater Park, and De Soto Park. In these areas,
the damage was complete, with “some houses being totally destroyed, and practically
all damaged.”34
The collapse of the Bayshore Boulevard seawall and the flooding of prosperous
neighborhoods in the city generated much concern as water invaded Tampa’s premier
homes. An account of damage in Edgewater Park compiled a list of “sufferers”
that identified the owners by name and gave the addresses accompanied by brief
damage reports. For example, the Tribune identified Mrs. J. H. Tucker among the
sufferers and noted, “house totally wrecked and floated three blocks away.”35 One of

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

“City Held in Dismal Grip of Gale Twenty-Four Hours,” Tampa Daily Times, 25 October 1921.
Grismer, Tampa, 248.
Weather Bureau U.S. Department of Agriculture, Hurricane Report, 1.
Williams and Duedall, Florida Hurricanes and Tropical Storms, 15.
“City Loss to Exceed $1,000,000,” Tampa Daily Times, 26 October 1921.
Ibid.
Weather Bureau U.S. Department of Agriculture, Hurricane Report, 3.
“Citizens Busy Righting Things after Big Blow,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 27 October 1921.
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The damage brought on by the 1921 Hurricane is evident in this photograph of the sidewalk, seawall and
roadbed along Bayshore Boulevard. Water flooded most of the homes on Hillsborough Bay from Ballast
Point to De Soto Park.

the most compelling features in this damage report is the description in parentheses
that followed the entry for the Ferrara family, whose home at the foot of Flagler
Street, overhanging the water, was a “total loss.” Tribune writers deemed it necessary
to clarify that the Ferrara family was Spanish, which provided insight into existing
ethnic divisions in the city.36 This qualification raised a question about whether or not
neighbors in the “prosperous development of Edgewater Park” viewed the Ferraras as
outsiders in their white enclave.
Loss of life totaled eight on the west coast of Florida, with five deaths occurring
in the vicinity of Tampa. Two individuals drowned, and falling wires electrocuted
three people, two of whom the Tribune described as “Negro children.” A falling tree
knocked wires onto the porch of a black family in Hyde Park. According to Mrs. W.
G. Squires of the Red Cross, who reported on the “affair,” “The children ran out to
36

Ibid.
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remove the wire. In so doing their death immediately followed.”37 Compared with
the sensational stories described below, the deaths of the two black children, who
were not even named, garnered only a mention in the newspaper report.38
The October 27 and 28 Morning Tribune editions provided a combination
of sensational survival accounts and tragic stories that contrasted with the confident
reports about recovery efforts. For example, the story about J. D. Wilder of Rocky
Point and his “night of terror” depicted the tragic side of the disaster. The elderly
Mr. Wilder clung to a palm tree all night with his eighty-five-year-old wife, only to
lose his grip on her hand and witness her being washed out to sea.39 The dramatic
tone of this account varied greatly from the front-page story about repair efforts,
whose author flippantly claimed, “Tampans awoke yesterday morning after a fitful
night’s sleep to find the greatest hurricane that had visited this section since 1848 had
blown itself out and it was time to take stock of the damage.”40 Mr. and Mrs. Wilder
definitely experienced more than an innocuous, fitful night’s sleep.
Another fantastic story recounted the “harrowing experience” of Mrs. C. W.
Greene, the wife of a prominent Tampa businessman, who tried to assist her husband
in securing their boat. While Mr. Greene struggled with the boat, Mrs. Greene sat
in the couple’s ten-foot skiff, which suddenly came loose from its mooring, sweeping
Mrs. Greene into the bay with only one oar. Using what the Tribune proclaimed as
“a display of seamanship which has perhaps never before been equaled in Florida
territory, she managed to guide her boat by shifting her weight from side to side, as
necessary” and safely arrive onshore.41 Like the Tribune’s October 27, 1921, headline
that noted, “Only Few Lives Lost,” the Weather Bureau’s report assessed that the loss
of life “was remarkably small, due to warnings, and to fact that storm came in day
time, when escape was possible from dangerous localities.”42
In spite of the damage, the Tribune summarized the losses throughout South
Florida and concluded on October 28, 1921, “Everyone is accepting the storm as
an incident and all are going to work to rebuild the devastated areas, with the firm
conviction that there will not be another storm of such severity during the life of
anyone now living.”43 Society events continued uninterrupted, and the Tribune
publicized the details of these gatherings. By dismissing the storm as an isolated
“incident” that would never occur more than once in a lifetime, the writers brushed
aside the hurricane’s significance and the regularity with which these natural disasters
plagued the state.

“Two Negro Children Killed by Live Wire,” Tampa Daily Times, 27 October 1921.
Ibid.
39
“Aged Man Clinging to Tree, Sees Wife Lost” Tampa Morning Tribune 27 October 1921.
40
“Citizens Busy Righting Things after Big Blow,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 25 October 1921.
41
“In Rowboat for 11 Hours at Mercy of the Storm,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 27 October 1921.
42
Weather Bureau U.S. Department of Agriculture, Hurricane Report, 3.
43
“Storm Damage General over Southwestern Part of State,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 28 October
1921.
37
38
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A glowing report by meteorologist Bennett pronounced Tampa’s response to
the hurricane to be nothing short of perfect. He acknowledged the importance of the
wide distribution of storm warnings in saving lives. A highlight on the front-page
coverage featured Bennett’s discussion of the storm’s damage to his own home on
Bayshore. Nevertheless, in a weatherman’s version of boosterism, Bennett declared,
“But I have confidence such a storm will never come this way again and I have started
repairs like my neighbors, for we know Tampa still lives, and this storm will not check
its growth.”44 Citizens like Bennett grew adamant that a hurricane would not detract
from the burgeoning promise of the state’s boom.
In Bennett’s final evaluation of the city’s response to the “great storm,” he
asserted, “The destruction of property could not be prevented by any human effort.”45
This explanation absolved humans of having any role in the damage and emphasized
the idea that these sorts of disasters were unnatural, an example of the “act of God”
approach that the historian Ted Steinberg rails against in his analysis of the 1935
hurricane that devastated the Florida Keys.46
Along similar lines, the Tampa Daily Times writer Con O. Lee compared
this “uncommon” side of nature to a “sweet little girl who has never said an unkind
word suddenly going on the warpath and wrecking furniture and committing
wholesale crime.”47 This idea supported the premise that nature was unpredictable
and vengeful. Lee also suggested that nature, and more specifically a hurricane, had
a female personality. This sort of rhetoric used to describe the 1921 storm added
fodder to Florida’s long history of gendering hurricanes, which the Weather Bureau
made official in 1950. Steinberg notes, “Transforming what had once been known
across America as ‘Florida hurricanes’ into female storms served to naturalize further
the destructiveness of these calamities.”48
Steinberg also evaluates the “Do-It Yourself Deathscape” Florida created, and
condemns the idea that humans do not play a role in these disasters. Steinberg poses
the question, “Why is South Florida a disaster waiting to happen?” He attributes much
of the problem to private developers building in areas vulnerable to natural disasters,
including hurricanes and flooding. After examining the state’s natural disaster history
while looking toward the future, Steinberg concludes, “Private-property-driven
economic development helped to sow the seeds of future destruction, while Florida’s
business community sought to deny the very real risks involved and, where possible,
to blame nature or God when disaster did occur.”49 The relationship between the
public’s response to the 1921 hurricane and the land boom foreshadows Steinberg’s
“Weatherman Optimistic for Future,” Tampa Daily Times, 27 October 1921.
“Storm Damage General over Southwestern Part of State,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 28 October

44
45

1921.
46
47
48
49

Steinberg, Acts of God, 64.
Con O. Lee, “Aftermaths of the Storm,” Tampa Daily Times, 27 October 1921.
Steinberg, Acts of God, 68.
Ibid., 48.
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Because of its position at the northern end of Hillsborough Bay, the neighborhood of De Soto Park,
located just south of Ybor City, received the brunt of the storm surge created by the 1921 Hurricane.

portrayal of South Florida’s natural disaster history.
An article about a weather event that occurred on the opposite side of the
United States emphasized another maneuver designed to draw attention away from
the recent storm in Florida and focus readers’ attention elsewhere. The October 27
edition of the Morning Tribune informed readers that Florida was not the only state
to experience natural disasters: “California Gets a Bit of Storm Too: Tornado Swings
into Sacramento.” The writer reported, “Scores of houses were unroofed, hundreds
of windows were broken out and other damage, the full total of which cannot be
estimated tonight.” This account suggested extensive damage, possibly on a greater
scale than damage reports of Tampa’s hurricane.50
The city’s desire to divert attention from the recent storm to a different type
of natural disaster far away diminished the hurricane’s significance. This technique
also raises the question of whether or not Florida writers seized on the tornado to
shift negative attention to a rival tourist destination. Davis notes the frequency
with which “natural disasters on several famous occasions have decisively influenced
the Darwinian competition among American cities and regions” —notably the
competition between South Florida and California in the wake of the 1926 and

50

“California Gets a Bit of a Storm Too,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 27 October 1921.
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1928 hurricanes.51 The example from October 27, 1921, emphasizes the idea that
this competition was gearing up as early as 1921.
By October 28, the tone of the articles in the Tribune changed, and writers,
businessmen, and citizens pronounced earlier damage reports to be exaggerated.
Headlines including such phrases as “Damage Estimates Diminish” and “Few Traces
Are Left” covered the paper’s front page. Journalists declared that the storm was no
more than a memory, and matter of factly explained, “Any person walking or driving
through the downtown section of the city last evening would have been hard put
to find a trace of storm damage.”52 Electric company crews and workers speedily
removed all signs of storm debris in an effort to return the city to normal as quickly
as possible and put the storm behind them. Boy Scout executive Roy Bachman issued
an edict for all Tampa Boy Scouts “to put on their uniforms and start out at once to
clear the streets of fallen limbs and also to help those who are in distress from the
storm.”53 Almost all the reports, including a special message from Tampa’s mayor,
Charles H. Brown, urged citizens not to “feel discouraged but look bravely ahead to
the future.”54
However, not everyone benefitted from this citizen response. Tampa City
Council reports from the October 31, 1921, meeting described the damage control
the city needed to perform after the storm. The city’s response included debris clearing
and assisting the people who had lost their homes in the storm. Unfortunately, the
city’s annual budget had no appropriation to cover this type of emergency. Resolution
172A solved this problem with the transfer of $12,000 for emergency cleanup funds
that the council previously allotted for the Spanish Town Creek sewer project.55
The rapidity of the citywide response brings up the question of why Tampa
was so eager to underplay the effects of the hurricane and bury all evidence of the
damage. By October 28, 1921, reports relating to the storm focused on recovery
efforts. Businessmen who returned to Tampa from the Northeast and other parts
of the country expressed concern about the “wild rumors” circulating across the
nation that Tampa suffered mightily in the storm. Travelers professed relief that their
business interests fared better than expected.56 Concern about the city and the state’s
image in the hurricane’s aftermath resulted in a barrage of booster reports about
Tampa’s welfare.
Peter O. Knight, vice president of the Tampa Electric Company, categorized
the storm as a “temporary setback” instead of a “disaster.” Knight professed dismay
and regret that “some very exaggerated stories have gained space in the newspapers
51
52
53
54

Davis, Ecology of Fear, 53.
“Damage Estimates Diminish,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 28 October 1921.
“Boy Scouts Are Called Out for Clean Up Duty,” Tampa Daily Times, 26 October 1921.
“Mayor Commends Public for Conduct during Trying Storm,” Tampa Daily Times, 26 October

1921.
55
Tampa City Council Minutes, 31 October 1921, 332. City of Tampa Archives.
56
“Temporary Setback, Not Disaster, in the Storm,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 28 October 1921.
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printed in other cities, stories having only the slightest basis in fact, or no basis at all,
and in some cases being wild imaginings.” Knight blamed other cities for spreading
these inaccuracies, which suggested eagerness on the part of overzealous reporters to
malign Tampa and disparage the state. He acknowledged that these “yarns” would
be harmful to business, but remained confident that the rest of the world would
quickly come to its senses. Knight employed booster images of Florida as a disasterfree paradise and denied or glossed over the state’s natural disaster record:
One should recollect that this state is freer from disasters than any other
in the country. Take the history of the past seventy-three years. There was
the hurricane of 1848 and the big freeze of 1894. Seventy-three years of the
state’s history and only two setbacks. We have no floods, we have had no great
conflagrations, no epidemics of disease. We have a climate that cannot be
duplicated in all the world; it can’t be bought, yet is ours without price.57
Knight’s complaints about the hyperbolic press led to questions about the
veracity of his claim. The press clearly and unsurprisingly sensationalized stories about
the hurricane. However, the combination of sensationalism and understatement
implied that the press suppressed the storm’s actual significance. Knight’s response
proved to be a dress rehearsal for trivialization of the far more powerful and
destructive 1926 hurricane. In 1926, he complained that the Red Cross should be
wary of doing more harm than good in their efforts to raise money for the devastated
coast.58 Clearly, hurricanes threatened Florida’s image as a paradise.
Florida’s realtors echoed Knight’s concerns at the weekly luncheon of the
Tampa Realtors’ Association. Members decried the inaccuracy of newspaper reports
in Tampa and elsewhere. This group adopted a long list of resolutions, culminating
in a demand that the local and Associated Press “be requested to use its columns in
correcting the erroneous impressions that have gone broadcast to the great detriment
of the city and south Florida.”59
These sources, studied in conjunction with the exaggerated reports in the
newspapers, highlight a conflict between the press and other groups that seized this
event as an opportunity to profit from the disaster, and the business class in Tampa,
which was determined to downplay the effects of the storm for fear that business
would suffer. In Acts of God, Steinberg analyzes a similar dispute in the aftermath of
the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. As he explains, “The battle to interpret the San
Francisco disaster began even before the smoke had cleared.”60
Ibid. Florida cities including Pensacola, Key West, and Tampa experienced severe yellow fever
outbreaks throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see Eirlys Barker, “Seasons of
Pestilence: Tampa and Yellow Fever, 1824-1905” [master’s thesis, University of South Florida, 1984]).
58
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The steamer Favorite was torn from its moorings on the east side of the Hillsborough River and carried
onshore near Plant Park, on the west side of the river, by the storm. The boat returned to service within a
few weeks of the storm’s passing.

The Tampa Morning Tribune reprinted some of the most compelling statements
regarding the hurricane in booster editorials from newspapers around the state and
the nation. For example, in “Sunshine Is Breaking through Storm Clouds,” the
Jacksonville Metropolis declared, “It can be truthfully stated Florida is less exposed to
storms and cyclones than the majority of states in the Union.” The author compared
Florida with the Midwest and the Far West, where residents expected tornadoes and
earthquakes to occur. Moreover, in the writer’s opinion, “These violent experiences
come under the heading of ‘Acts of Providence’ and the only way to take them is
philosophically, because they are beyond the control of man.” Nevertheless, Floridians
did not need to worry about their future, even after the storm, because their land was
one of “enviable prosperity, illimitable resources and an admirable citizenry.”61
Similarly, the Louisville Courier Journal published a piece that distinguished
between a gale and a hurricane. According to the writer, the recent storm was nothing
61

“Sunshine Is Breaking through Storm Clouds,” Tampa Morning Tribune, 30 October 1921.
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more than a gale, which is a “wind between the speed of a stiff breeze and the speed
of a hurricane. It is a steady dependable sort of storm. The native knows what to
expect of it.” Furthermore, Tampans had restored everything in the city. Then, the
writer lapsed into purple prose to describe the aftermath in Tampa: “The sun shines.
The sky is again glorious. The mockingbird greets the dawn from the top of the
magnolia.” In case readers did not grasp the “gale’s” insignificance, the Louisville
Courier Journal provided a meteorological comparison between these minor storms
and the dreaded cyclone in the Midwest, the foreign typhoon, and the likelihood of
contracting pneumonia in the cold North. 62
Thus, these articles about dreadful natural disasters in other parts of the
United States and the world diverted attention from Florida and minimized the
regularity and significance of hurricanes in the state. Although the editorial in the
Louisville Courier Journal did not dismiss the possibility of a storm affecting Florida
in the future, the writer confidently concluded, “The worst storm since 1897 and
such other storms as Florida may experience in the future, will not affect the flow of
settlers or tourists to that singularly blessed state.”63 By this point, the press refused to
describe the incident as a hurricane and instead preferred to use watered-down terms
such as “gale.”
Boosters and businessmen recast publicity about the storm in a positive light as
they described reconstruction and damage control as heralds of boom days to come.
At the end of Knight’s 1921 article, he described Tampa as “prosperity untouched”
and urged readers, “Look ahead and see what is coming!”64 The Florida frenzy known
as the land boom had begun, and no hurricane could stop it, or rather Tampa would
not allow a hurricane to halt the boom’s promise. In fact, evidence suggests that the
hurricane contributed to boom-time prosperity. At least some individuals wanted
citizens to believe that even a natural disaster could bring good fortune. In the
midst of the chaos generated by the storm, the Tampa Daily Times reported that the
increased building in Tampa served as a sign of boom days to come. Lumber, roofing,
and construction companies profited in the storm’s aftermath as citizens struggled to
rebuild as quickly as possible. Some of these articles alluded to profiteering during
the rebuilding as carpenters accused lumber companies of unfairly raising prices and
merchants increased the cost of survival necessities such as candles and lamps.65
While Tampans eagerly looked ahead to pie in the Florida sky, the storm dissipated
from the citizens’ collective consciousness. Steinberg refers to the machinations to
describe, deny, disassociate, and forget natural disasters, regardless of scale, as the
“politics of forgetfulness.” This phenomenon would not benefit Florida or the United
States in the future. In 1926, 1928, and 1935, the state faced a series of frightful

62
63
64
65
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hurricanes that were made more tragic by the efforts to diminish and forget earlier
natural disasters.66
In a special editorial that apppeared just days after the 1921 hurricane hit, the
Tribune posed the question, “Can Tampa Ever Be Second Los Angeles?” Woodward
F. Barnwell, a booster and businessman, outlined a plan for Tampa’s progress that
would elevate the city’s status above that of Los Angeles. Barnwell touted the endless
possibilities that Tampa offered: “Our geographical location, fertile soil, mining
possibilities, perfect climate and other natural advantages cry out to every man,
woman and child in West Florida for development.”67 Barnwell neglected to mention
the recent hurricane or the likelihood of another storm affecting the state because
the disaster did not fit the image of progress, even though parallels existed between
natural disasters and the public responses in Los Angeles and Tampa. The writer
emphasized what he believed to be the necessary role of humans in reshaping the
environment to create cities that would suit their own needs: “Cities like children
must be trained intelligently; proper growth, physical, mental and moral cannot be
gained in a haphazard manner. There must be a force with knowledge and experience
leading, teaching, educating and forever striving for a definite end.”68
In Tampa after the 1921 hurricane, boosters, businessmen, city officials, and
the press united in their reaction to the natural disaster, and they remained fixated on
progress, profit, and prosperity—definite ends. Tampans would not allow a hurricane
to interfere with the land boom’s promise—at least not a category 1 hurricane. In fact,
they used the rebuilding process to boost development. However, the 1926, 1928,
and 1935 hurricanes that later desolated regions of Florida proved more formidable
opponents in man’s contest to control both nature and popular perceptions of its
meaning.
Both historians and contemporary observers have advanced a variety of
explanations for the outcomes of these storms. Analyses of the 1926 hurricane
determined that lax building codes and an absence of construction inspections
proved disastrous.69 It seemed unlikely that building codes would have been better
five years earlier. Nevertheless, Tampa’s small area, which totaled 8.6 square miles,
and the limited amount of development, provided other explanations for the storm’s
reported lack of damage.70 The historian Raymond Arsenault emphasizes the role of
“demography and nature,” not scientific or technological advancement, in challenging
the traditional natural disaster discourse. He concluded, “Beginning in 1926, a series
of powerful hurricanes disrupted the Great Florida Boom, causing extensive damage
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Tampa’s streetcar system sustained heavy damage during the hurricane. This view, taken near Ballast Point,
shows a streetcar that was caught in the storm, becoming stranded after losing both power above and
tracks below.

and loss of life in an area that had been all but uninhabited a generation earlier.”71
While Floridians in the twenty-first century might feel more secure with
construction regulations and hurricane tracking, the concept of disaster inflation
raises an interesting question. How would Tampa fare in 2008 if a hurricane of
similar strength to the 1921 storm hit the now much larger metropolis and its areas
of urban sprawl? Dick Fletcher, the former meteorologist for WSTP St. Petersburg,
predicted “property damage would be about $25 billion to $50 billion higher.”72
As Mike Davis explains in his study of Los Angeles: “Vulnerability to disaster has

Raymond Arsenault, “The Public Storm: Hurricanes and the State in Twentieth-Century America,”
in Paradise Lost?: The Environmental History of Florida, ed. Jack E. Davis and Arsenault (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 2005), 210.
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an inflationary dimension. Uncontrolled horizontal growth of the megalopolis
relentlessly undermines existing infrastructures.”73 Floridians have been fortunate
during the recent hurricane season. However, on the eighty-seventh anniversary of
the 1921 storm, we must question the degree to which economic motivations dictate
a natural disaster’s damage and influence our efforts to control modern Florida’s
image.
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